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Abstract
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY INSURANCE AND LOSS DISTRIBUTION IN
TORT LAW Kenneth Abraham University of Virginia School of Law This paper
locates tort liability within our larger system of compensation for injury and ill-
ness, and comparesthe tort system’s functioning and scopewith the other methods
of loss distribution that are employed by the system. This review reveals the extent
to which there is in fact a vast system of loss distribution, of which tort is only a
small part. On the other hand, that system is by no means comprehensive; it con-
tains important gaps. The central issue is whether these gaps should be ﬁlled by
tort or by the other sources, and how that might be accomplished. The paper then
turns to the relationship between tort and the rest of the loss distribution system. It
analyzes the different possible relationships by identifying and exploring the loss
distributional and other impacts of four possible variants of the collateral source
rule. My conclusion is that none of these variants satisfactorily reconciles the ten-
sion between tort law’s deterrence goal and its comparative ineffectiveness at loss
distribution. Finally, the paper looks at the rarely-considered, distinct treatment
accorded to life insurance and savings under existing rules, and then recommends
a “full-subrogation” approach to tort law’s treatment of collateral sources. In or-
der to retain tort law’s deterrence potential but enhance overall loss distribution,
potential tort victims should be permitted to transfer their full causes of action to




As recently as the middle of the 20th century, loss distribution was at the center of 
debate about the proper functions of tort law.  Tort theorists such as Fleming James, Roger 
Traynor, and Charles Gregory argued that greater liability should be imposed on enterprises 
whose activities cause physical injury and damage
1.  One of the principal bases for this argument 
was that business and professional enterprises were in the best position to spread the cost of 
losses associated with their activities, either directly, by increasing the price of their products and 
services, or indirectly, by purchasing liability insurance.
2
*Robert E. Scott Distinguished Professor of Law and Class of 1966 Research Professor, University of 
Virginia School of Law.  Thanks are due to Vincent Blasi and David Rosenberg for their comments on an earlier 
draft of this paper.
1James’s campaign for the adoption of enterprise liability is reflected both in his torts treatise and in a series 
of articles he authored both before and after publication of the treatise.  See generally FOWLER W. HARPER AND 
FLEMING JAMES, JR., THE LAW OF TORTS (1956).  Traynor’s most famous statement of his position favoring 
enterprise liability was his concurring opinon in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 150 P.2d 436 (1944). 
Gregory’s position is expressed in Charles W. Gregory, Trespass, to Negligence, to Absolute Liability, 37 VA. L. 
REV. 359 (1951).  For an account of the overall movement, see George L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise 
Liability: A Critical History of the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461 (1985).  A 
fairly recent effort to revive the movement can be found in VIRGINIA E. NOLAN & EDMUND URSIN, UNDERSTANDING 
ENTERPRISE LIABILITY (1995).
2Dean Prosser, the leading tort scholar of the time, also acknowledged loss distribution as a legitimate 
function of tort law.   See WILLIAM L. PROSSER , HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 22 (4th ed. 1971).  The classic 
exposition of the relation between loss distribution and other goals, of course, is to be found in GUIDO CALABRESI, 
THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 39-54 (1970).
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Looking at the subject fifty years later, it is clear that viewing loss distribution as a 
principal goal of tort law has long been out of academic fashion.  This has occurred for two 
reasons.  First, the second half of the 20th century witnessed an explosion of other methods of 
distributing losses, predominantly in the form of private first-party and social insurance.  To 
many tort theorists, it is not now necessary for tort law to promote loss distribution, whatever the 
argument for doing so may once have been, because first-party insurance is now performing that 
task.  Second, because of the rise of first-party and social insurance, because it is now less 
obvious than it once seemed to be that enterprises can easily insure against the risk of civil 
liability,
3 and for reasons of academic taste, tort theorists have become preoccupied with issues 
other than loss distribution.  Whether and how tort law should promote optimal deterrence 
occupied the lion’s share of tort theorists’ attention for the last several decades of the 20th 
century.  Recently, corrective justice and related views have experienced something of a 
renaissance in academic circles.
4  The attention paid to deterrence and corrective justice, and to 
the proper role of each within tort law, has largely crowded out concern with loss distribution. 
Regardless of whether academics consider loss distribution to be an important 
goal of tort liability, however, loss distribution issues cannot be avoided in thinking about tort. In 
practice the tort system has been anything but indifferent to loss distribution.   The major 
expansions in the incidence and scope of liability that occurred in the 1970's and 80's can be 
ascribed at least in part to loss distributional aims.  The same can be said of the consistent 
3See Kenneth S. Abraham, The Rise and Fall of Commercial Liability Insurance, 87 VA. L. REV. 85 
(2001).
4See, e.g., JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS (2002); ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE 
LAW (1995); John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin Zipursky, Unrealized Torts, 88 VA. L. REV. 1625 (2002). 
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increases in real tort costs from that period to the present,
5 as well as the continued willingness of 
contemporary courts to maintain the legal precedents that helped to generate the expansion of 
products and mass tort liability during the past few decades.
6  Achieving loss distribution through 
tort may have largely vanished from academic radar screens, but it is still alive in the actual 
practices of tort law.
Moreover, even we were able to rule out purposely shaping the scope of liability 
rules to achieve greater loss distribution, tort must have a method of addressing the relationship 
between its own liability and damages rules and the vast range of sources of compensation for 
personal injury and illness that operate outside of tort.  These “collateral” sources, comprised 
largely of private first-party and social insurance, have almost always already provided tort 
claimants with some compensation, and often with very substantial compensation, by the time a 
tort case finally comes to be tried or settled.  The payment of additional benefits to claimants by 
these sources is also often in prospect for those with continuing or permanent injuries.  Whatever 
rule governs the relationship between tort damages and these other sources of compensation 
inevitably will have a loss distributional (or antidistributional) impact.  Tort must therefore 
confront the question of how it will deal with these sources, as well as the loss distributional 
impacts of the options that are available.
Naturally enough, tort law’s traditional approach to its relation to collateral 
sources has been termed the “collateral source rule.”  But in fact there are at least four possible 
collateral source rules, each with its own approach to the treatment of benefits paid or payable by 
5See Tillinghast-Towers Perrin, U.S. Tort Costs: 2003 Update 12 (hereinafter “U.S. Tort Costs.”)
6See Gary L. Schwartz, The Beginning and Possible End of the Rise of Modern American Tort Law, 26 GA. 
L. REV. 601 (1992).
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collateral sources, and each with corresponding loss distributional effects and implications.  In 
this Chapter I examine these effects and implications, in an effort to make sense out of the 
relation between tort liability and the disparate world of first-party and social insurance.  I argue 
that, because tort liability is a comparatively poor method of distributing losses, we should 
reshape the relationship between tort liability and collateral source payments.  First-party 
insurance policyholders and social insurance beneficiaries, who are all of course potential 
plaintiffs in personal injury litigation, should be permitted to transfer all their tort rights to their 
first-party insurers, in return for lower premiums or more generous coverage.  This “full-
subrogation” approach would preserve the deterrent effect of the threat of tort liability, but at the 
same time enhance the possibilities for loss distribution through forms of insurance that are 
superior to tort because they pay a higher percentage of their expenditures to victims and provide 
more certain recovery.  Because the approach would be optional rather than mandatory, it would 
not put the state in the business of deciding the proper mix of tort rights and insurance for all 
individuals.  Rather, individuals would be permitted to make this decision for themselves.
In order to place tort law in an insurance perspective, Part I surveys and quantifies 
the magnitude of the different sources of compensation for personal injury, illness, and death.  
This survey locates tort liability within our larger “system” of compensation and compares its 
functioning and scope with the other methods of loss distribution that are employed by the 
system.  This survey reveals the extent to which there is in fact a vast system of loss distribution, 
of which tort is only a small part.  On the other hand, that system is by no means comprehensive; 
it contains important gaps.  The central issue is whether these gaps should be filled by tort or by 
the other sources, and how that might be accomplished.
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To address this issue the Chapter then turns to the relationship between tort and 
the rest of the loss distribution system.  Part II analyzes the different possible relationships by 
identifying and exploring the loss distributional and other impacts of four possible variants of the 
collateral source rule.  My conclusion in this Part is that none of these variants satisfactorily 
reconciles the tension between tort law’s deterrence goal and its comparative ineffectiveness at 
loss distribution.  Finally, Part III looks at the rarely-considered, distinct treatment accorded to 
life insurance and savings under existing rules, and then recommends the full-subrogation 
approach to tort law’s treatment of collateral sources, in order to retain tort law’s deterrence 
potential but enhance overall loss distribution. 
I.  THE TORT SYSTEM IN INSURANCE PERSPECTIVE
Lawyers and academics are tortcentric.
7  We tend to think of the tort system as the 
center of the personal injury and illness universe, whereas – as I will show below – in 
quantitative terms tort is only a minor player in this universe.  As lawyers we are inclined to 
think naturally in terms of lawsuits, not insurance or compensation programs.  We read cases, we 
litigate cases, we derive the rules upon which we base legal advice from cases.  Private and social 
insurance generally lie at the periphery of this world of litigation and judicial decisions.  The 
primary domain of insurance is instead a set of abstruse contracts that typically are not read by 
policyholders, or obscure and bureaucratic regimes such as social security, whose contours are 
vague until the time comes to apply for the benefits they provide.  Ask the average lawyer what 
her rights would be if she were injured by a negligent driver, and she will have a pretty good idea 
of the correct answer.  Ask her what she would receive from social security and under what 
7See Richard B. Stewart, Crisis in Tort Law? The Institutional Perspective, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 184 (1987).
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circumstances she would receive it if she became disabled, and the chances are she would draw a 
blank.  One consequence of this differential awareness, I think, is that as lawyers we tend to 
overrate the importance of tort, both as a method of deterring unsafe conduct and as a source of 
compensation, and to underrate the other methods of promoting safety and compensating the 
victims of illness and injury.
8
 In a sense this is because tort is unique in its features.  Tort liability is the only 
significant device we employ specifically to compensate the victims of third-party wrongdoing.  
In another sense, however, tort is just one component of a larger system of compensation for 
personal injury and illness.  Viewing tort not in isolation from this larger system, but as a part of 
it, helps to reveal tort’s comparatively modest scope.  The sheer amount of money spent each 
year to compensate the victims of injury and illness tell a story that words alone do not 
adequately capture.
9
8There are other reasons for this tortcentricity as well.  The central place that the course in Torts has played 
in the law school curriculum for over a century, and continues to play today, has a profound influence on the legal 
consciousness.  Torts occupies its honored place in the first year of law school partly out of intertia, partly because it 
is as good a subject as any to provide the basis for teaching about the common law and the legal process, and partly 
because it provides a template for thinking about the non-contractual (and non-tort) civil liabilities that are the 
subject of more advanced courses in the curriculum.  Many of these subjects – securities law, employment 
discrimination, even copyright – depend on the notions of duty, breach, damage, and causation that form the 
conceptual framework for what is studied in the first-year Torts course.  In this sense it is not tort law itself but these 
tort law concepts that are the necessary building blocks in a legal education.  In addition, areas other than Torts in 
which the law also does the work of compensating injury or promoting safety do not receive nearly the same 
curricular prominence.  Courses in safety regulation are divided by medium -- environmental law or food and drug 
law, for example.  And in most law schools today there is no course at all on product safety regulation, though there 
is sometimes a course on products liability law.  On the compensation side the curriculum is also lean, as well as 
divided.  Courses on insurance are no longer rare, but neither are they prominent in most law schools.  And they are 
virtually always about private insurance alone.  Public or social insurance receives little attention in the typical law 
school’s curriculum, and when a course does address the subject it is often from the perspective of welfare or 
proverty policy, without much emphasis on compensating for injury or illness.  Workers compensation  receives even 
less attention.  Only twenty-two individuals were reported to be teaching a course on Workers Compensation in an 
American law school during the year 2003-04.  See THE AALS DIRECTORY OF LAW TEACHERS 1442-43 (2003).
9Unfortunately, the most recent year for which cost and benefits-paid data is available varies, depending on 
the compensation source or program in question.  I have chosen to use data from the latest year available for each 
source or program, in order to provide the most accurate picture of each separate source or program as is possible.  
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Tort.  The total direct cost of the tort system is roughly $233 billion per year.  This 
is a more than 100 fold increase since 1950, when tort costs were about $2 billion.  The increase 
in tort costs during this period has outstripped economic growth by a factor of 3.
10  Not all of this 
sum, however, is paid on account of losses associated with personal injury and illness.  Some 
portion of the total is paid in connection with claims for property damage, for pure economic 
loss, and for losses associated with dignitary torts such as defamation and invasion of privacy.   
For the sake of simplicity I will assume conservatively that 75 percent of the $233 billion annual 
cost of tort is the result of claims for personal injury and illness.  Consequently, the proper figure 
to keep in mind for purposes of comparison with other sources is a direct tort cost of $175 
billion.
The percentage of this sum that is paid to personal injury and illness victims 
cannot be pinpointed exactly.  One recent estimate is that only 46 percent of all expenditures, 
which based on the above calculation amounts to about $80 billion per year, is paid to victims.
11
There is also somewhat less recent data on particular sub-fields within tort.  Only a bit more than 
half of all money expended on automobile liability goes to victims,
12 In contrast, products 
liability and medical malpractice pay a considerably smaller portion of their expenditures to 
As a consequence, in comparing sources and in estimating the total costs of compensation paid by the system as a 
whole, my survey adds together or compares data from different years for different sources.  Given the hundreds of 
billions of dollars involved and the relatively modest changes that occur from year to year, however, the inaccuracy 
that results is probably minimal.
10All this data can be found in U.S. Tort Costs, supra note 5, at  1. 
11See id at 17.
12See JAMES S. KAKALIK & NICHOLAS M. PACE, COSTS AND COMPENSATION PAID IN TORT LITIGATION 72 
(1986).
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victims – perhaps as little as one-third.
13
Only half or even less of what we spend on tort is paid to victims, of course, 
because the system spends a great deal for the individualized fact-finding regarding negligence, 
causation, and damages that are so characteristic of tort.  The theory of corrective justice requires 
monetary awards that are carefully tailored to the evidence of each particular plaintiff’s past and 
probable future losses, both economic and emotional.  And the search for optimal deterrence 
dovetails with this individualized tailoring of awards.  To achieve deterrence the system must 
strive to threaten and to impose liability on defendants for all, but no more than all, of the costs 
that their negligence causes.  Making this determination can be costly.  In this respect the two 
approaches that compete for the dominance of tort theory converge, both requiring that a 
considerable portion of the tort dollar be spent on the cost of administration rather than on 
compensation itself.
Workers’ Compensation.  Workers’ compensation pays benefits for injuries 
“arising out of or in the course of employment.”  Benefits paid by this nonfault system of 
compensation for job-related injuries are lower than those paid by tort, $46 billion as compared 
to tort’s $80 billion.
14  Because workers compensation is essentially a system of absolute liability 
on the part of the employer, however, fact-finding as to liability is usually unnecessary.  As a 
consequence, the cost of administration related to that issue is generally low.  Therefore, workers 
compensation pays a much higher percentage of the total dollars it expends in benefits than does 
13See COMMITTEE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, WHO SHOULD BE LIABLE? 53 (1989) (estimates of 35-45 
percent); STEPHEN D. SUGARMAN, DOING AWAY WITH TORT LAW 23-24 (1989) (citing estimates of 37-40 percent).
14See UNITED STATES BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 352, Table 
532 (2002) (hereinafter “STATISTICAL ABSTRACT”).
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tort – over 82 percent.
15
15Id. (calculated by comparing benefits paid to total expenditures).
   Although benefit levels vary from state to state, typically injured workers are paid all their 
medical costs. However, wage protection is limited.   Most states limit payment to about 2/3 of 
the employee’s weekly wage, and then up to a maximum of $15,000 to $20,000 per year.  Lump 
sum payments for specified permanent disabilities are also paid.
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Health Insurance.  By far the largest non-tort source of compensation for personal 
injury and illness is health insurance. Health care costs in the United States exceed $1.1 trillion 
per year.
16  Third-party payments made for direct health care costs (as distinguished from medical 
research, etc.) total about $846 billion per year, of which payments by public sources such as 
Medicare, Medicaid, and other smaller programs account for $423 billion,
17 and private insurance 
for roughly the same amount.
18  Together these sources pay about 79 percent of all personal health 
care expenditures,
19 leaving individuals to pay $194 billion per year themselves.
20  A significant 
portion of these personal expenditures is incurred by persons with no health insurance or 
inadequate insurance: about 15 percent of the population has no health insurance at all.
21
Life Insurance.  Life insurance is also a significant method of loss distribution.  
16Id. at 92, Table 113. 
17Id. at 340, Table 510.
18Id. at 92, Table 113.  The remaining third-party-paid funds are paid by non-patient revenues and other 
sources.  Id., n. 1.
19Id. 
20Id. All but a very small proportion of the cost of hospital care is insured, whereas nearly one-fifth of the 
cost of ambulatory care is paid by individuals.  U.S. Census Bureau, Report No. P60-215: Health Insurance Coverage 
2000, Tables 3-5 (in 1997, 2.6 percent of the cost of hospital care and 17.3 percent of the cost of ambulatory care was 
paid for out-of-pocket).  Private insurers pay about 95 percent of the premium dollar in benefits. See STATISTICAL 
ABSTRACT, supra note 14, at 93, Table 113 and 93, Table 117 (calculated by comparing total benefits paid of $423 
billion to total premiums of $444 billion).  Payout ratios for all the public sources cannot easily be calculated because 
of their methods of accounting, but the ratio for the largest – Medicare – is similar at 96 percent.  Id. at 92, Table 113, 
and 340, Table 511 (calculated by comparing total benefits paid of 215 billion to total expenditures 224 billion).  
These comparatively high payout ratios are not achieved because health insurers and government bureaucrats 
necessarily do their jobs efficiently, but because of the nature of these compensation systems.  Since a right to health 
insurance benefits is triggered by the mere occurrence of a health care expense, the determination of eligibility and the 
proper amount of payment is largely a clerical rather than a fact-finding function. 
21Id. at 102, Table 137.
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The average insured household is covered by nearly $200,000 of life insurance.
22  Fixing the 
proper of amount of life insurance benefits to figure into the calculus requires some estimation, 
however, because life insurance represents both insurance and savings.  Each year over $44 billion 
is paid to the beneficiaries of life insurance policyholders as death benefits.
23  But an additional 
$31 billion is paid as living benefits, in the form of cash surrender or investment return.
24  An 
indeterminate portion of this sum is undoubtedly used by recipients to cover injury and illness 
costs. 
Life insurance has sometimes been considered to be payment to assuage grief.  But 
it is more accurate and useful to conceive of life insurance as compensation for loss of earning 
power or human capital.  A household that purchases insurance on the life of its principal income 
earner is not buying protection against grief; rather, it is insuring against the possibility that it will 
be deprived of support by the premature death of the insured.  Life insurance is therefore best 
understood mainly as a method of compensating for income lost because of death resulting from 
illness or injury.
25  On this view, although $200,000 may seem like a significant amount of 
insurance, it is in fact inadequate protection against lost income for virtually all families – at 
current interest rates this sum would yield an annual income of less than $10,000.
Disability Insurance.  The majority of payments for disability -- income lost 
22AMERICAN COUNCIL OF LIFE INSURERS, LIFE INSURERS FACT BOOK 117, Table 7.14 (2001) (hereinafter 
“LIFE INSURERS FACT BOOK 2001”)
23AMERICAN COUNCIL OF LIFE INSURERS, LIFE INSURERS FACT BOOK 75-77 (2002).
24Id.
25See Kenneth S. Abraham and Kyle D. Logue, The Genie and the Bottle: Collateral Sources under the 9/11 
Victims Compensation Fund  54 DE PAUL L. REV. __ (2004).
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because of the inability to work – are made by the Social Security Disability program.  This 
program pays about $55 billion per year for total, long-term disability.
26  But the average monthly 
benefit is only $814 to each disabled beneficiary and $238 to children of disabled beneficiaries.
27
Statistics on benefits paid by privately purchased long-term disability insurance are difficult to 
obtain, because these payouts are comparatively small – I estimate that they are on the order of 
$10 billion per year.
28  Roughly 25 percent of private sector employees have long term disability 
insurance -- though the discrepancy in the percentage of individuals in different wage groups who 
are covered is striking.  Whereas 47 percent of white-collar employees are covered, only 13 
percent of blue collar employees are.
29  In addition, benefits paid for short-term disability, in the 
form of paid sick leave, are available to about one-half of the work force.
30  Based on the data 
available, my very rough estimate is that the magnitude of these payments is $23 billion per 
year.
31  Thus, payouts from all these forms of disability coverage total about $88 billion 
26See UNITED STATES BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 345, Table 
526 (2001).
27Id. at 346, Table 519.
28See LIFE INSURERS FACT BOOK 2001, supra note 22, at 137, Table 9.1 (over $13 billion in private 
disability insurance was in force in 2000); Kenneth S. Abraham and Lance L. Liebman, Private Insurance, Social 
Insurance, and Tort Reform: Toward a New Vision of Compensation for Illness and Injury, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 75, 
82 (estimating payments of $6 billion in 1988).
29National Academy of Social Insurance, 1996 Disability Panel Interim Report, 33-34.  Part of the 
explanation for this discrepancy is that because the disability protection afforded by workers’ compensation and social 
security covers a much higher proportion of the typical blue collar worker’s potential loss of income, such workers 
have less need for additional, private coverage.
30See JERRY L. MASHAW AND VIRGINIA P. RENO (ED.’S), THE ENVIRONMENT OF DISABILITY INCOME POLICY: 
PROGRAMS, PEOPLE, HISTORY AND CONTEXT 34 (1996).
31Sick pay costs are about $.17 for every $15.80 in wages and salaries paid, or about 1.1 percent of pay.  
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 14, at 406, Table 618.  The mean hourly wage of U.S. workers is $16.35.  Bureau 
of Labor Statistics, Occupational Employment Statistics 2001, available at 




Putting these figures together, as reflected in Table I, yields a rough idea of the 
quantitative importance of tort liability within our broader system of compensation for illness and 
injury.  In very rough terms, that broader system costs about $1.7 trillion annually, of which $175 
billion, or about 10 percent, is for personal injury and illness tort costs.
33  Looking at percentages 
of benefits paid rather than percentages of costs, $1.1 trillion in benefits is paid each year, of 
which about $80 billion, or just over 7 percent, is paid to the relevant subset of tort victims.
[Insert Table I about here]
Table I
Annual Personal Injury and Illness Compensation Costs
(in $ billions)
Expenditures Benefits Paid
Tort   175   80
Workers Compensation         56   46
Health Insurance 1100 846
Health Care Out-of-Pocket   194 --
Life Insurance     48   44
Disability Insurance 96 88
Total 1669 1104
year, worked by the 50 percent of the 127 million workers for whom sick pay is available, see id., then sick leave 
costs to employers are roughly $.18 per hour, or $374 per year for each of about 64 million workers – about $24 
billion annually.  Assuming about $1 billion in administrative costs yields an estimate of benefits paid per year of $23 
billion.  
32There are a number of other programs, public and private, that pay benefits to the victims of injury and 
illness.  These include the federal childhood vaccine compensation plan; the Florida and Virginia birth-related 
neurological injury compensation funds; and auto no-fault plans in force in over a dozen number of states.  These 
programs are important conceptually, because -- along with workers compensation -- they reflect an activity-based 
alternative to the largely fault-based approach of tort.  But quantitatively they pay only a few billion dollars per year 
to victims and therefore are barely visible on the radar screen.
33To make this calculation I have assumed that the programs for which I have data only on payouts, but no 
meaningful or usable data on premiums or receipts, pay about 90 percent of their receipts as benefits.
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Thus, tort plays a small role in our system of public and private loss distribution.  
Tort is also a comparatively inefficient compensation mechanism, in that it pays a much smaller 
percentage of its expenditures to victims than the other approaches.  And because the other 
approaches compensate on a broader basis, they are superior not only at loss distribution but also 
at risk distribution.  On the other hand, payments made by the overall system are far from 
sufficient to compensate all the victims of illness and injury for all their losses.  Although there is 
therefore at least a potential a role to be played by tort in filling the gaps in our overall loss 
distribution system, the question is whether expanding tort or the features of our broader system 
of compensation is the better method of addressing this problem.
II.  THE RELATION BETWEEN TORT AND FIRST-PARTY AND SOCIAL INSURANCE
There can be little question that, whatever might be said about the treatment of 
collateral sources in tort for loss distribution purposes, optimal deterrence is best served by a rule 
that ignores these sources in determining the amount of damages for which a defendant is liable.  
Otherwise defendants are not threatened with liability for the full social cost of their actions.  Of 
the four possible rules explored below, the first three – each a different version of the “nonoffset” 
approach – serves the deterrence goal.  The last, or “offset” approach, is less concerned with 
deterrence, and instead threatens defendants only with liability for the losses that plaintiffs have 
actually suffered, net of insurance.
Each of the approaches has different loss distributional consequences.  Thus, even 
if one takes the extremely plausible position that because tort is an inefficient approach to 
affording compensation its rules should emphasize deterrence, the different loss distributional 
http://law.bepress.com/uvalwps/uva_publiclaw/art115
consequences of the three nonoffset approaches that reflect this emphasis still are worth 
considering.  Similarly, given the criticism that the traditional, nonoffset collateral source rule 
continually receives at the hands of the proponents of certain versions of tort reform, the 
distributional consequences of the offset approach should also be considered.  Thus, even if loss 
distribution is ruled out as a major goal of tort, it is not possible to escape thinking about loss 
distribution in establishing and evaluating tort law’s treatment of collateral sources.  Perhaps more 
importantly, examination of each of the existing approaches to the treatment of collateral sources 
reveals that none of them satisfactorily reconciles the tension between tort law’s goal of 
promoting deterrence and achieving effective loss distribution.
A.  The Collateral Source Rule and Insurance Reality
A recurring theme in the tort law literature and in debates about tort reform has 
been the proper role of payment by collateral sources in determining the successful plaintiff’s 
damages.
34  Should there always be a full award of damages to tort claimants, notwithstanding 
past or anticipated future payment of benefits to the claimant by these sources, or should the 
amount of benefits paid to the claimant by collateral sources such as insurance be offset against 
the award, in order to avoid duplicate recovery?
For almost as long as this theme has existed, however, it has been understood that 
posing the question in this way is simplistic.  When the traditional collateral source rule applies 
and there is no offset against the award, the plaintiff does not necessarily secure duplicate 
recovery.  Even setting aside the fact that the damages awarded may be incomplete and that 
contingent counsel fees ordinarily must be paid out of the award, another device is designed to 
34See. e.g., FOWLER W. HARPER & FLEMING JAMES, JR., 2 THE LAW OF TORTS § 25.22 at 1343-54 (1956); 
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preclude double recovery: subrogation.
35
Subrogation is the process by which one party is substituted for another party 
relative to the latter’s rights against a third party.  By operation of law or by contract, virtually all 
forms of private insurance and many forms of social insurance have rights of subrogation, 
transferring to insurers the policyholder’s or beneficiary’s right of recovery against third parties, to 
the extent of payment by the collateral source.  For example, a health or workers’  compensation 
insurer that has paid a policyholder’s medical expenses is typically subrogated to the 
policyholder’s rights of recovery against a tortfeasor responsible for the injury that generated these 
expenses.
Although this right of subrogation can in theory be vindicated in a direct action 
brought by the insurer against the tortfeasor, the more conventional method of vindication is 
through reimbursement of the insurer of the policyholder out the policyholder’s tort recovery.   In 
short, through what I will call “subrogation reimbursement,” duplicate recovery by the tort 
claimant can be avoided.  Indeed, in a sense the traditional collateral source rule exists precisely in 
order to make such reimbursement possible without depriving the policyholder of the potential for 
obtaining full compensation.
In practice, however, three factors impede this seemingly ordered approach.  First, 
insurers do not always monitor tort suits brought by their policyholders so as to be in a position to 
vindicate their subrogation reimbursement rights when there is a tort recovery subsequent to the 
payment of insurance benefits. Doing so over a period of years is costly, and in the case of 
John G. Fleming, The Collateral Source Rule and Loss Allocation in Tort Law, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1478 (1966).
35See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY, AND PUBLIC POLICY 153-56 
(1986).
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comparatively small potential reimbursement, not necessarily cost effective.
Second, since most cases are settled, an administratively simple method of dividing 
a settlement that isolates the insurer’s proper share of an incomplete pie is necessary, to make it 
possible for reimbursement to take place automatically.  But none of the alternatives is entirely 
satisfactory, and not all states have clearly specified one.
36
Third, to function ideally, the system should also permit future subrogation 
reimbursement.  That is, after any claimant has recovered in tort not only for past but also for 
future losses, the claimant will begin to incur additional out-of-pocket losses as a result of the 
harm for which she has already received damages from the defendant.  A collateral source that 
then pays insurance benefits to such a claimant should in theory receive subrogation 
reimbursement from that same claimant, since the claimant has already recovered in tort for some 
or all of these losses.  But whether these future payments are made on account of losses resulting 
from the prior tort or from an independent illness or injury becomes increasingly difficult and 
correspondingly more expensive to determine as time progresses.  Accounting for the benefits 
paid and the subrogation reimbursement due also would be bizarre.  It is difficult to imagine a 
health insurer paying for a policyholder’s medical care and then billing the policyholder for 
reimbursement to the extent that the care had been provided on account of an injury for which the 
policyholder had already received a tort recovery.
For these reasons among others, it is common for health and disability insurers 
who are about to receive subrogation reimbursement at the time of a tort recovery to waive any 
right they have to future reimbursement, in return for present reimbursement.  But of course these 
36For an illustration of the problems that arise in fashioning such a method, see Associated Hospital Service 
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particular insurers will not necessarily be the insurers of the claimant at all times in the future, and 
the claimant’s future insurers are not bound by such a waiver.   Especially in cases involving 
severe, permanent injury, in which a substantial portion of the recovery awarded to the plaintiff 
may be for future out of pocket losses, the potential for subrogation reimbursement to fail in this 
major way is significant.
Thus, for a variety of reasons, although we must take the possibility of subrogation 
reimbursement into account in considering the distributional consequences of different approaches 
to the treatment of collateral sources in tort, we should also recognize that subrogation theory and 
subrogation reality may differ, and sometimes substantially.
B.  The Loss Distributional Choices
Modern tort law has developed two different general arrangements for dealing with 
collateral sources.  The traditional, or nonoffset, approach is known as the “collateral source rule,” 
and denies the tortfeasor any credit for benefits paid or payable to the plaintiff by collateral 
sources.  Subrogation reimbursement by collateral sources is then permitted to ensure that the 
plaintiff does not secure any duplicate recovery.  The alternative offset approach enacted in a 
minority of states provides the tortfeasor with a credit that reduces the plaintiff’s tort recovery by 
amounts paid (and sometimes payable) by collateral sources.
Under these two approaches the issue is not whether to avoid duplicate 
compensation – both nonoffsets linked with subrogation reimbursement and offsets have the 
potential to achieve that goal. Rather, the issue is which party should be the primary cost bearer –
the tortfeasor and its liability insurer, or loss-based sources of insurance.  If tort damages are 
of Philadelphia v. Pustilnik, 396 A.2d 1332 (Pa. Super. 1979).
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offset by payments from loss-based sources, then these latter sources are primary insurers. If there 
are no offsets, then the tortfeasor and its liability insurer are primary insurers, because they pay in 
full and the plaintiff’s collateral sources receive reimbursement for their payments out of the tort 
award.
But it turns out that these are merely general categories.  There are in fact potential 
variations that yield four different possible treatments of the relation between tort recoveries and 
the benefits that are paid or payable by collateral sources.  The different approaches that are 
available have quite different impacts on the distribution of loss.  The following examination of 
these approaches begins with the nonoffset approaches, and within this category moves from the 
variation that is most generous to tort claimants and least advantageous to nontortiously-harmed 
victims, to the variation that is least generous to tort victims and most advantageous to 
nontortiously-harmed victims.  It then explores the alternative, offset approach.  
1.  Nonoffsets without Collateral Reimbursement
The broadest existing approach for using tort law’s treatment of collateral sources 
for loss distribution purposes is to preclude offsets through the traditional collateral source rule, 
but also to preclude subrogation reimbursement of first-party and social insurance sources.  This is 
the approach that has always applied to life insurance, and largely to life insurance alone.
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Applied more broadly, this approach would maintain the traditional rule’s focus on ensuring that 
the cost of tortiously-caused loss is channeled through the tortfeasor or its liability insurer. At the 
same time, however, this approach would recognize that because most tort recoveries are partial, 
37Though rare in connection with other forms of insurance, this approach is occasionally prescribed by 
statute applicable in other limited contexts.  See, e.g., Ann. Code of Md.§ 19-109 (2002) (prohibiting subrogation by 
insurers providing medical payments coverage under auto insurance policies).
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even the plaintiff’s tort recovery plus her first-party insurance and benefits may not provide full 
compensation.
Tort recoveries are often incompletely compensatory in part because the 
contingent-fee system almost automatically produces under-compensation for any claimant who 
recovers less than her full losses by judgment or settlement.  In the aggregate, the sums paid by 
plaintiffs as counsel fees are equal to seventy-nine percent of the awards for non-economic loss 
net of counsel fees.
38  When a contingency-based counsel fee is subtracted from full, or much 
more often, from partial recovery, the claimant is therefore likely to be undercompensated.  Thus, 
the majority of victims, who settle for less than their full losses, probably are left less than fully 
compensated for their out-of-pocket losses even before paying any subrogation reimbursement 
they owe to their health or disability insurers.  
In addition, a high percentage of all tort claims -- certainly over 90 percent -- are 
settled.  Virtually by definition the claimants in these cases receive less than full compensation.  
There may well be a certain amount of “excess” compensation that claimants who settle have been 
paid by collateral sources that is not ultimately returned to insurers because of the shortfalls in 
enforcement of subrogation reimbursement to which I referred earlier.  But in the aggregate this 
excess is likely to be more than offset by the payment of counsel fees.
39  In short, many claimants 
probably do not recover even their full economic losses, and those that do recover these losses in 
38See U.S. TORT COSTS, supra note 5, at 17 (claimants’ attorneys fees constitute 19 percent of total tort 
costs, while awards for noneconomic loss constitute 24 percent). 
39Since total payments for economic loss net of counsel fees are only slightly greater than amounts paid for 
counsel fees, see id. (awards for economic loss constitute 22 percent of total tort costs; awards for claimants’ counsel 
fees constitute 19 percent), counsel fees are likely to exceed the amount of the claimant’s prior collateral source 
payments that are not reimbursed to the insurer.
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full probably succeed in doing so only if they are not forced to reimburse their health and 
disability insurers out of their recoveries.
There are three distributional objections, however, to institutionalizing a no 
subrogation reimbursement rule to go along with the nonoffset approach.  First, this approach 
would favor tort victims at the expense of victims of nontortiously-caused injury and illness. 
Subrogation reimbursement is a means by which premium levels or costs for first-party and social 
insurance are contained.  Denying these sources reimbursement would provide a benefit to the 
minority of policyholders or beneficiaries who suffered tortiously-caused injury, but only by 
disadvantaging the majority whose losses are not tortiously-caused, by increasing their premiums 
or reducing the amount of coverage that would otherwise be available to them.
Moreover, as we saw in Part I, tort is a comparatively expensive way to provide 
insurance against loss, paying at most only 50 percent of all of its expenditures to victims.  Those 
who pay tort “premiums” as part of the price of products or health care would rationally prefer to 
use those premiums to buy more first-party insurance rather than tort insurance. That would 
provide more actual insurance for the money. In addition, first-party insurance provides more of 
the kind of insurance that individuals rationally would prefer.  First-party insurance provides a 
more certain payoff than tort and it provides a payoff of out-pocket-expenses only.  Ordinarily, 
suffering a nonpecuniary loss does not alter an individual’s need for money.  From an insurance 
standpoint, therefore, more than a modicum of tort insurance against nonpecuniary loss, or pain 
and suffering, is not a sensible purchase for most people.
Second, denying insurers subrogation reimbursement would accord a priority to 
compensating for intangible loss rather than first ensuring compensation for out-of-pocket loss 
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resulting from illness or injury. That is, the compensation shortfall experienced by some claimants 
means at least in part that reimbursing their insurers for already-paid out-of-pocket loss deprives 
the claimants of some or all of their pain and suffering damages.  Denying insurers reimbursement 
would result in an increase in the cost of first-party insurance, in order to permit claimants to keep 
these pain and suffering damages.  In effect, potential tort victims would be paying their first-party 
insurers a premium for the right to retain all the pain and suffering damages they recovered.  For 
the reasons specified earlier, this is probably not a purchase most policyholders rationally would 
or should want to make.
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Third, a no-reimbursement rule would in effect charge first-party policyholders an 
additional premium for the chance of recovering more than their net losses in the event that they 
were tortiously injured and were fully compensated in tort.  A claimant fully compensated in tort 
but without any subrogation reimbursement obligation would double-recover at least some out-of-
pocket losses.  First-party insurance premiums would rise, because the absence of subrogation 
reimbursement would decrease insurer revenues.  This would amount to the mandatory purchase 
by policyholders of a lottery ticket that would pay off if they were tortiously injured and brought 
completely successful tort suits. This would not constitute insurance, however, which distributes 
the risk of suffering loss, but a gamble that would provide the chance of obtaining a net financial 
gain as a result of being tortiously harmed.  A rational purchaser of insurance would not want to 
spend money on this kind of gamble.   
2.  Nonoffsets with Collateral Reimbursement Subject to a Make-Whole
Constraint
40For an argument to the contrary, see Steven D. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, The Nonpecuriary Costs of 
Accidents: Pain and Suffering Damages in Tort Law, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1785, 1812-34 (1995) (arguing that under 
certain conditions consumers might desire to insure against pain and suffering).
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This is a version of the traditional collateral source rule precluding offsets, but with 
a qualification that is added in some jurisdictions.  Under this variation, collateral sources  have 
no right of reimbursement until the plaintiff has been made whole.
41
The crucial feature of this “make-whole” requirement is its treatment of pain and 
suffering damages.  Typically a prerequisite to the insurer’s right to subrogation reimbursement 
under the make-whole rule is that the plaintiff have been fully compensated for both out-of-pocket 
and intangible loss.
42  In such cases the make-whole constraint precludes reimbursement virtually 
every time a case has settled, as well as in cases tried to judgment in which the defendant had a 
partial defense such as comparative negligence.  For practical purposes, therefore, this approach 
tends to preclude subrogation reimbursement in most cases, and is subject in these cases to the 
objections detailed in the preceding section.
On the other hand, if – as tends not to be the case – compensation for pain and 
suffering were excluded from the make-whole calculation, then the make-whole constraint would 
establish tort as a gap-filler, providing compensation for out-of-pocket loss in precisely those 
cases in which a plaintiff’s first-party insurance was insufficient to cover all such loss.  Since in 
the aggregate the amount of pain and suffering damages retained by plaintiffs after paying counsel 
fees is roughly equal to counsel fees themselves, the make-whole constraint would generally 
enable plaintiffs to retain the amount of any recovery of uninsured damages for out-of-pocket loss 
that was still left after paying counsel fees, plus perhaps some pain and suffering damages as well.
41See.,e.g., Duncan v. Integon General Ins. Corp., 482 S.E.2d 325 (Ga. 1997).  See also Elaine M. Rinaldi, 
Apportionment of Recovery between Insured and Insurer in a Subrogation Case, 34 TORT & INS. PRAC. J. 803 
(1994).
42See, e.g., Rimes v. State Farm Automobile Ins. Co., 316 N.W.2d 348 (Wis. 1992).
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This approach would meet some but not all of the objections to non-reimbursement 
analyzed earlier.  It would not risk overcompensating for out-of-pocket loss.  And any first-party 
insurance premium increases occurring on account of the make-whole constraint on subrogation 
reimbursement would be paid so as to ensure full recovery of out-of-pocket loss rather than to 
enable the policyholder to retain pain and suffering damages.  However, like the blanket 
prohibition on subrogation reimbursement, the make-whole constraint privileges tort claimants at 
the expense of victims of nontortiously-caused injury and illness, whose first-party insurance 
premiums are higher than they would be in the absence of the make-whole constraint on 
subrogation reimbursement.  The effect is therefore to give priority to expensive loss distribution 
through tort, rather than less expensive and therefore more loss-distributive first-party and social 
insurance. 
Moreover, the administrative complications associated with a make-whole 
constraint on subrogation reimbursement can be substantial.  The problem is how to determine 
whether the plaintiff was or was not made whole, regardless of the conception of being “made 
whole” that is employed.   Note first that this problem would not arise in cases in which there had 
been no reduction in damages because of comparative negligence or a similar defense and the case 
was tried to a verdict.  By definition these are cases in which the plaintiff has been or at least 
could be treated as having been fully compensated for her losses.  But no such presumption could 
be made in cases involving reduced verdicts; only if all cases were required to employ special 
verdict procedures could the verdict reveal whether and to what extent the make-whole constraint 
had been satisfied.
More importantly, the vast majority of tort claims are compromised through 
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settlement.  One of the main advantages of a settlement is that it avoids the need to adjudicate the 
amount of the plaintiff’s losses.  But only by knowing each category as well as the total amount of 
the plaintiff’s losses can the amount that has as yet been uncompensated be determined. So the 
consequence of a make-whole rule is that, after every tort case that is settled, the damages portion 
of the case may have to be litigated anyway, in order to determine whether the plaintiff has been 
made whole. This can be done in something less than a full-scale damages trial.  But an 
adjudicative proceeding of some sort, with all the expense entailed in fact-finding and possibly 
substantial discovery, is necessary.
43  Thus, any appealing features of even the modified make-
whole rule that I have described above would require further complicating and thereby rendering 
more expensive the resolution of most tort claims.
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3.  Nonoffsets with Off-the-Top Collateral Reimbursement
Under this approach the plaintiff is entitled to full recovery in tort regardless of 
payments made by collateral sources,
45 but those sources are entitled to subrogation 
reimbursement off-the-top of tort judgments or settlements, regardless of whether this will deprive 
the claimant of full compensation -- i.e., keep the claimant from being made whole.
By returning more money to first-party insurers than the make-whole approach, in 
43For somewhat anedotal but nonetheless suggestive evidence that, in order to avoid this problem, in practice 
the insured, the insurer, and plaintiff’s counsel often agree on an even, three-way split of settlements, see Tom Baker, 
Blood Money, New Money, and the Moral Economy of Tort Law in Action, 35 LAW & SOC’Y Rev. 275, 304-08 ( 
2001).
44
A variation on this approach that is occasionally applied, though to settlements only, apportions the settlement 
between the insurer and insured in the proportion that the amount the insurer has paid to the policyholder bears to the 
policyholder’s total loss.  See ALAN I. WIDISS AND ROBERT E. KEETON, INSURANCE LAW §310 (b)(1) at 234 (1988).  
The fact-finding difficulties entailed in this approach parallel those posed by the make-whole approach.
45See Restatement of Torts (Second) § 920A(2) (1979).
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the aggregate this approach either permits the purchase of more first-party insurance than would 
otherwise be available, or reduces the cost of premiums.  This approach thus gives all 
policyholders, rather than merely tort claimants, this advantage.  As a matter of loss distribution 
this benefits more people and at lower cost than the preceding two nonoffset approaches.  There is 
admittedly still some administrative cost entailed in accomplishing subrogation reimbursement, 
since it involves the cost of collection by first-party and social insurers.  But this cost is lower than 
under the make-whole rule, which requires fact-finding as to the proper amount of reimbursement 
in addition to the cost of collection.  In contrast, under the off-the-top approach the proper amount 
of reimbursement is always a specified sum – the full amount the insurer has paid to or on behalf 
of the claimant.
In short, the rule embodied in this variation preserves the deterrence-promoting 
potential of any nonoffset rule, but also channels more loss distribution resources through first-
party and social insurance than the other nonoffset variations.  It does this at comparative sacrifice 
in the net compensation of tort victims, in effect tolerating potential undercompensation in tort in 
return for enhancing loss distribution through these other, more cost-effective methods of 
distributing loss.
4.  Offsets with No Collateral Reimbursement
I now turn to the offset approach, which reduces the amount of the plaintiff’s tort 
recovery by benefits paid or payable from first-party and social insurance sources.  This approach 
sacrifices potential deterrence in return for eliminating the risk that the plaintiff will be 
overcompensated through the combined receipt of first-party insurance and tort damages.  It also 
avoids the cost of collecting subrogation reimbursement.  
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This approach has been enacted by statute in a minority of states, thus reversing the 
traditional collateral source rule.
46   Under this approach any sum that has been paid or (often) that 
will be payable in the future by collateral sources is offset against the plaintiff’s tort recovery.  
The plaintiff therefore recovers in tort only the difference between the amount paid or payable by 
collateral sources and her total losses.  To the extent that the plaintiff is fully insured for out-of-
pocket losses, then, her tort recovery consists exclusively of pain and suffering damages.  Only to 
the extent that the plaintiff is underinsured does she recover out-of-pocket losses in tort.  In effect 
tort is a gap filler under this approach, “topping up” the plaintiff’s total recovery to ensure full 
compensation.  To make tort truly gap-filler only, first-party and social insurers therefore have no 
subrogation reimbursement rights under this approach.  This approach is thus a rough mirror 
image of the nonoffset variation that is subject to a make-whole constraint, under which first-party 
and social insurance “top up” tort recoveries.
From a loss distribution standpoint alone, this approach more sensibly uses tort as 
a secondary source of compensation rather than as a primary source as is done under the nonoffset 
approach.  But of course this is just a complicated way of saying that tort is a comparatively 
inefficient insurance mechanism, and of underscoring that it is mainly the non-distributional 
purposes of deterrence and corrective justice that lie behind the nonoffset approaches.  
46See, e.g., N.J. Stat. §2A:15-97 (2003); Mont Code Ann §27-1-308 (applicable to actions for injury or death 
where total award exceeds $50,000).  Some states apply this approach only where a collateral source has no 
subrogation rights, thus adopting the traditional rule for sources with subrogation rights and the offset rule for sources 
without such rights.  See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-225(a) (2003).
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Perhaps more importantly, once it is recognized that the sums paid as counsel fees 
tend to be roughly equal to the amount  pain and suffering damages that plaintiffs retain,
47
47See U.S. Tort Costs, supra note 5, at 17.
 the underlying political motive behind the enactment of this approach comes into view.  The 
plaintiff is likely to bring a tort action under this approach only if she has substantial uninsured 
out-of-pocket expenses or the potential for recovering substantial pain and suffering damages. 
Otherwise she will be unable to find counsel willing to take the case on a contingent-fee basis, 
since potential recovery will be prohibitively small. So whatever its loss-distributional effects, the 
actual motive behind this approach is to obtain tort relief for potential defendants.
http://law.bepress.com/uvalwps/uva_publiclaw/art129
Interestingly, however, by making tort merely a gap filler in this way, the offset 
approach also reduces the income regressive effect of certain forms of tort liability.  In contract 
settings that may give rise to tort liability, the de facto tort “premium” paid as a component of 
product or health care prices, for example, is not calibrated to the probable amount of income loss 
that the purchaser will incur if she is injured by a defective product or by medical malpractice.
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The result is that both comparatively poor and comparatively wealthy purchasers pay the same 
“tort insurance premium” as part of the price of products or of health care, but the wealthier 
claimants get more tort insurance for that same premium because they are more likely to have 
higher income loss than the poor when they are injured.  The effect is therefore that compensating 
for lost income through tort has an income regressive impact.   The lesser role that is left for tort 
by the offset approach reduces this effect, since the effect is mitigated or eliminated by first 
paying for income loss out of first-party and social insurance, whose premiums are more 
proportional to the amount of income loss insured and therefore much less (or not at all) income-
regressive than tort.  
Finally, although the effect of this approach is to employ a make-whole norm with 
tort as only a secondary source of payment, the approach does not create the same fact-finding 
difficulties or corresponding expense that the make-whole constraint creates under the nonoffset 
approach, which makes tort the primary source of payment.  Because first-party insurers are not  
entitled to any subrogation reimbursement under this approach, there is no need for any 
adjudicatory proceeding in cases involving verdicts reduced because of defenses such as 
48See George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521, 1558-59 
(1987); David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A “Public Law” Vision of the Tort 
System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 851, 918-19 (1984).
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comparative negligence, or in settled cases, in order to determine the share to be recovered by 
first-party insurers.  Rather, juries are instructed to apply offsets (or to find the facts necessary for 
the court to apply them), and presumably settlement occurs in the shadow of the rule that offsets 
will be applied in any case that goes to judgment. The make-whole norm under an offset approach 
is in this sense self-applying.
III.  TOWARD A NEW TREATMENT OF COLLATERAL SOURCES
We now have several aspects of the loss distribution issue on the table: 1) the 
scope of our tort and first-party and social insurance systems; 2) the gaps in first-party insurance 
that sometimes appear to make employing tort for loss distribution purposes appealing; 3) the 
different ways in which these two parts of the system may relate to each other; and 4) the loss 
distribution implications of these different possible relations.  Still missing, however, is a sense of 
how one important form of coverage, life insurance, figures in the picture.
In fact, life insurance is wholly exempt from the treatment that other sources 
receive; as I noted earlier, the nonoffset-without-collateral-reimbursement applies almost 
exclusively to life insurance.  Once we consider treating life insurance in the same manner as all 
other collateral sources, however, then none of the four possible collateral source rules seems 
satisfactory.  An alternative approach, which would transfer not only a right of reimbursement, but 
all the tort claimant’s rights to first-party insurers, then begins to be attractive.
A. Life Insurance: No Longer a Special Case ?
Life insurance has always fallen outside the scope of both the majority and 
minority approaches to collateral sources.  For tort law, it is as if life insurance simply did not 
exist.  
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The majority approach to the treatment of all other collateral sources involves 
nonoffsets in tort, with subsequent collateral reimbursement for most sources.   Life insurers have 
no equitable rights of subrogation
49 and never provide for subrogation rights by contract.  
Consequently, tort claimants have no obligation to reimburse their life insurers out of tort 
recoveries or settlements.  True duplicate recovery – rather than the only apparent duplicate 
recovery that occurs prior to the subrogation reimbursement of health and disability insurers out of 
tort recoveries – may actually occur as a result of this arrangement.  Correspondingly, in the 
minority of jurisdictions that take the offset approach to other collateral sources, life insurance 
benefits are always exempted from the required offset.
This seemingly anomalous treatment of life insurance is, I think, the legacy of two 
factors.  First, the courts long treated life insurance as though its purpose was to assuage grief 
rather than to indemnify future economic loss.  But few families can afford or find it rational to 
spend current dollars protecting against the risk of suffering future grief.  So in fact life insurance 
is purchased primarily to provide income replacement upon the death of a family’s income earner.  
Nonetheless, because traditionally the courts made equitable subrogation available only to 
indemnity insurers – that is, only to insurers who insured against out-of-pocket losses – life 
insurers were never permitted this form of subrogation reimbursement out of tort recoveries in the 
absence of policy provisions granting them this right.
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Second, although the courts might well have permitted life insurers to provide for 
49See, e.g., Spencer L. Kimball and Don A. Davis, The Extension of Insurance Subrogation, 60 MICH. L. 
REV. 841, 845 (1962) (“In life insurance, there seems little doubt that, absent contractual stipulation, subrogation 
would be denied uniformly.  Dicta are plentiful, but no cases actually decide the matter.”).
50See, e.g., Michigan Hospital Service v. Sharpe, 63 N.W.2d 638, 644 (Reid, J. dissenting), (quoting 29 Am. 
Jur. 1003-04) (Mich. 1955) (“There seems to be little doubt that a life insurance company cannot recover of one who 
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such subrogation reimbursement by contract – as health and disability insurers have long provided 
– this practice never developed either.  The explanation probably is that market forces prevented 
contractual subrogation in life insurance from arising.  Any life insurer seeking to vindicate its 
subrogation rights would likely have had to do so against a widow or orphan who had obtained a 
tort recovery for the death of an insured husband or father.  These circumstances would not have 
been propitious ones for companies in an industry competing largely on the basis of reputation 
and reliability rather than product differentiation.  So subrogation rights stayed out of life 
insurance policies.
This state of affairs was almost certainly reinforced by the limitations on recovery 
for wrongful death that obtained until relatively recently.  Unlike recovery for non-fatal injury or 
illness, recovery for wrongful death is a creature of statute.  And originally the statutes creating a 
cause of action for wrongful death contained two important limitations: a right to recover for 
economic loss only, and comparatively modest monetary ceilings on recovery even for economic 
loss.
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has caused the death of an insured the amount which it has thereby been compelled to pay.”)
51See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 296, at 807-11(2000).
  In view of these limitations on recovery of the amount of loss resulting from tortiously-caused 
death, the absence of life insurers’ subrogation reimbursement rights may well have been seen as a 
sensible counterweight to the risk of undercompensation.  Life insurance helped to top-up partial 
recoveries in tort for wrongful death and thereby to promote full compensation overall.  
Exempting life insurance from the treatment accorded all other collateral sources, that is, was a 
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way to promote loss distribution.
In the second half of the 20th-century, however, the last vestiges of the two 
limitations on the damages that may be recovered for wrongful death largely disappeared.  Both 
the prohibition on awarding damages for intangible loss resulting from wrongful death, and 
monetary ceilings on total recoveries, were eliminated.  The rationale for exempting life insurance 
payments from the treatment accorded the other forms of insurance that also are available to tort 
claimants and their families has therefore also disappeared.
Any altered treatment of life insurance under the collateral source rule, however, 
would have implications for more fundamental questions about the relationship between tort 
recoveries and need.  Life insurance is merely one form of savings.  Why should those who have 
chosen this form of savings have it deducted from their tort recoveries, whether directly or 
indirectly, while those who have chosen a different form of savings do not incur a deduction?
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That is, would it be inconsistent to subect life insurance benefits to the same treatment as other 
collateral source payments but to ignore other sources of wealth available to the victim’s 
survivors?
The argument that there would be no inconsistency is that life insurance is a very 
particular form of savings.  Unlike any other form, life insurance (and the devices allied with it, 
such as lifetime annuities) is stochastic.  That is, setting aside any investment feature that is added 
to it, life insurance is never available until death is certain, or virtually so.
53  Life insurance is 
52This is essentially the problem that has created the most controversy over the September 11 Victims’ 
Compensation Fund, which, unlike tort, does reduce the benefits recoverable from the Fund by life insurance 
payments.  See Kenneth S. Abraham and Kyle Logue, The Genie and the Bottle: Collateral Sources under the 9/11 
Victims Compensation Fund, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. __ (2004).
53Accelerated, or “viatical” settlements in connection with life insurance are the exception to the notion that 
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designed to protect against future loss of income, whereas other forms of savings are or could 
immediately be converted into present income. Thus, life insurance is a current asset, but not 
current income.  Indeed, conceived as savings, perhaps the asset value of life insurance is only the 
premium that is paid for it.
The distinction between assets and income does not resolve the issue, however, but 
merely shifts the focus of the question.  Why not offset against recoveries in tort for wrongful 
death both all current income and all assets that can be converted into income, rather than 
offsetting only insurance benefits?  The answer depends on how this would fit with the goal of
 promoting loss distribution.  One view is that loss distribution is desirable in general, because of 
the diminishing marginal utility of money.  The very fact that people tend to be risk averse and 
therefore purchase various forms of insurance is some confirmation of this view.  It follows from 
this view that imposing a comparatively small loss on a large number of people will reduce 
overall utility less than imposing a large loss on one person, regardless of these individuals’ 
wealth.  To the extent that this is true, then it may make sense to ignore assets and savings in 
determining how tort law should treat collateral sources. 
life insurance policies pay only upon the death of the party whose life is insured.  These settlements are paid when 
death is virtually certain and imminent.  See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW & REGULATION: CASE AND 
MATERIALS 293-94 (2000). 
An alternative view, however, is that we value loss distribution not only because of 
the diminishing marginal utility of money generally.  From a moral standpoint, we may also value 
loss distribution because it has the potential to satisfy the needs of those who have no other means 
of obtaining compensation for their losses.  In this sense loss distribution is a good because of its 
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potential for improving the condition of those who need to have their losses mitigated.   To the 
extent that this is the case, the savings or wealth of a claimant should be treated in the same way 
as her first-party and social insurance “wealth,” since the wealthier the claimant, the less need 
there is to mitigate her losses.
Of course, putting this line of reasoning into practice would bring us a long way 
from the traditional collateral source rule, and would ask tort law to take more factors into account 
in calculating damage recoveries than would be realistic.  We are not about to means-test tort 
recoveries, precisely because loss distribution is not tort law’s main goal.  Concerns about 
deterrence and corrective justice so dominate tort that, even if we thought it otherwise desirable to 
do so, there would be no way to means-test recoveries across the board and still maintain the 
levels of liability necessary to achieve deterrence and corrective justice.  Potential defendants’ 
levels of care would significantly decline, because of the decreased magnitude of liability they 
would face, and everyone would be significantly worse off because of the substantial increase in 
tortiously-caused loss that would result.  Any loss-distributional aims that tort law pursues must 
therefore be interstitial, deferring where necessary to tort law’s more dominant purposes.  
B.  Transforming the Treatment of Collateral Sources
With the interstitial loss distribution effects of different approaches to collateral 
source payments and the issue of how to treat life insurance both on the table, it is time to take a 
step back and look at the big picture.   We have seen that the central challenge for tort law’s 
treatment of collateral sources is how to preserve deterrence while at the same time taking 
advantage of the much greater of efficiency of first-party and social insurance as methods of 
compensation.  Offsets sacrifice deterrence in order to accord these forms of insurance loss-
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distributional priority.  Nonoffsets preserve deterrence, but at the cost of some combination of 
possible overcompensation, significant administrative expense, and making tort – an inefficient 
loss distributor -- the primary source of compensation.  We are thus faced with a choice between 
unsatisfactory alternatives.
Two principles can help lead away from this dilemma.  The first principle, already 
noted, is that first-party and social insurance are superior to tort as methods of affording 
compensation, because the compensable event under these systems is simple and easily applied. 
The result is that a much higher proportion of the money invested in loss distribution finds its way 
into the pockets of victims under first-party and social insurance than in tort.  The second 
principle is that, from a loss distributional standpoint, out-of-pocket expenses should have a 
higher compensation priority than intangible loss. It may be arguable that awarding pain and 
suffering damages serves corrective justice; and in my view awards of at least some damages for 
pain and suffering are necessary to promote optimal deterrence.  But although pain and suffering 
is a real social cost, the loss that pain and suffering damages reflect cannot be “distributed” by 
awarding victims monetary compensation.  The victims of pain and suffering do not need their 
losses distributed; they need their pain and suffering relieved.  Paying damages for pain and 
suffering does not relieve pain and suffering. It is instead an economic substitute for relief, as well 
as a means of attempting to ensure that the plaintiff’s counsel fees can be paid without depriving 
her of compensation for out-of-pocket loss.
54
54It may be that ceilings on pain and suffering damages, otherwise deeply objectionable on equitable 
grounds, are also a crude reflection of the idea that only secondary priority should be accorded to pain and suffering 
awards. Ceilings, however, extract the entire burden of reform from two groups.  The first group is composed of those 
who are awarded damages for pain and suffering that exceed the pain and suffering they have actually experienced.  
This group has no legitimate complaint about ceilings.  The second group, however, is composed of those whose pain 
and suffering would otherwise warrant an award in excess of the ceiling.  Because life expectancy is a prime 
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Combining these two principles with the desirability of preserving deterrence 
suggests an alternative approach. We should permit potential tort victims to invest their available 
insurance dollars more heavily in first-party insurance protecting them against the risk of suffering 
out-of-pocket loss, rather than on tort “insurance.” But we should continue to threaten defendants 
with liability for the full social cost of harm they cause, including intangible loss. 
A number of scholars have proposed full-subrogation approaches that would allow 
this ideal to be approached.  In one way or another they propose authorizing plaintiffs to sell their 
tort causes of action in return for additional protection against out-of-pocket loss.
55  What these 
approaches amount to, using the kind of terminology I employed in Part II,  is “nonoffsets with 
total collateral recovery.”  The plaintiff would continue to have formal tort rights, but her first-
party insurance contract would provide that her total tort recovery – not merely the benefits 
already paid or payable by the insurer – would be returned to her insurer as subrogation 
reimbursement.  The plaintiff would then be a plaintiff in name only, since the real party in 
interest would be her first-party insurer.  
This general approach would preserve the deterrence that is a central feature of the 
nonoffset approaches, but would enable potential tort claimants to transform their right to recover 
pain and suffering damages into less expensive, or more broadly protective, first-party insurance.  
ingredient in the determination of a pain and suffering award where pain and suffering is permanent, this group will be 
disproportionately composed of young, seriously injured victims – especially children.   Therefore, it is  seriously 
injured children who are likely to be most disadvantaged by the enactment of ceilings.
55See, e.g., CHARLES FRIED &  DAVID ROSENBERG, MAKING TORT LAW 91-92 (2003) (tort rights to be 
transferred to first-party insurers); Robert Cooter &  Steven D. Sugarman, A Regulated Market in Unmatured Tort 
Claims: Tort Reform by Contract, in WALTER OLSON (ed.), NEW DIRECTIONS IN LIABILITY LAW 174 (1988) (tort 
rights to be transferred to employers); Jeffrey O’Connell & Janet Beck, Overcoming Legal Barriers to the Transfer of 
Third-Party Tort Claims as a Means of Financing First-Party No-Fault Insurance, 58 Wash. Univ. L. Quart. 55 
(1979) (tort rights to be transferred to first-party insurers).
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Of course, the details of this approach need to be worked out in more detail.  It ought to be 
provided as an option for policyholders to accept or reject, and even then only after significant 
efforts have been made to ensure that the policyholder has given informed consent to the 
arrangement.  That way the state would not decide the proper mix of tort rights and insurance for 
all individuals; that decision would be made individually rather than collectively, as is now done.  
Since the vast majority of private first-party insurance is employment-related group 
health insurance, a method of returning premiums saved or providing additional coverage to the 
individual policyholders electing the option would have to be developed as well. A method of 
designating the insurer that would hold the the newly-enhanced right of subrogation 
reimbursement would also be required. It is easy enough to picture a bifurcation, however, under 
which health insurers (for example) received the right to payment of all damages
for out-of-pocket expenses and conscious pain and suffering, whereas the right to recover 
damages for wrongful death was transferred to life insurers, with corresponding reductions in 
premiums or increases in the amounts of coverage provided by these sources.
The victims of torts might also have to be provided with an incentive to participate 
actively in the insurer’s conduct of tort suits, since victims would effectively become mere 
witnesses without any economic stake in the outcome.  Some sharing of pain and suffering 
damages by the victim and the insurer above a specified level might prove to be an optimal 
method of obtaining this participation.  Since certain insurance companies might come to 
specialize in this form of recovery, and as a secondary market involving tort lawyers representing 
these insurers probably would develop, competition among insurers would likely generate a 
variety of options.  Finally, the subrogation reimbursement rights of other collateral sources would 
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have to be preserved, so that (for example) disability insurers were reimbursed by health insurers 
out of the tort recoveries that health insurers obtained.
But these are operational features, some of which the proponents of this approach 
have already addressed.  Although the devil is sometimes in the details, the principle of the matter 
must be the first item on the agenda.  No doubt the most seriously injured victims who had 
previously opted into the new approach would experience ex post regret at the choice they had 
made. This would be no different from the other tort-waiver choices that we permit individuals to 
make, however, and indeed no different than some choices we make for them – including the 
universal enactment of workers’ compensation as a substitute for tort and the enactment of 
mandatory auto no-fault in a number of states.
56  In event, at present we make the opposite 
decision mandatory, by holding in most instances that the waiver of tort rights prior to injury is 
invalid.
57
This approach might well help to fill part of the gap in the fabric of protection 
against out-of-pocket loss that still remains and so troubles both the tort and social welfare 
systems.  As I noted earlier, there are still substantial gaps in the fabric of protection provided by 
first-party insurance.  Fifteen percent or more of the population has no health insurance; nearly 
one-fifth of the cost of out-patient medical care is uninsured; few income-earners have private or 
public disability insurance that provides more than slightly-above-subsistence level wage-loss 
protection, many having only social security protection against long-term, total disability; and 
56Admittedly, however, these systems usually eliminate the tort rights of the least seriously injured, not those 
with the greatest prospects of recovering pain and suffering damages. For what may be the earliest proposal to make 
the choice between tort and auto no-fault optional, see Guido Calabresi, The New York Plan: A Free Choice 
Modification, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1971)
57See, e.g., Tunkl v. Regents of the University of California, 383 P.2d 441 (Ca. 1963).
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most families have insufficient life insurance to protect them against the income loss they would 
suffer upon the death of the principal wage-earner in the family.
58
Tort has not filled these gaps, nor has political action on the health and disability 
insurance fronts for several decades now.  Perhaps by creating a market for potential tort claims, 
revision of the collateral source rule can do what we have thus far failed to do – contribute to the 
provision of sufficient health-care and income-loss protection for everyone in the United States.  
If the uninsured cannot now afford to pay for health and disability insurance with currently 
available funds, some of them may be willing to pay part of the necessary premium for such 
coverage by transferring their right to recover for personal injury in tort to these insurers, in return 
for insurance coverage that they can afford.   We would then have achieved greater loss 
distribution, not by expanding the scope of tort liability, but by modifying the relationship 
between tort recoveries and collateral sources and creating a means by which tort rights can be 
transformed into superior forms of insurance. I do not want to argue that this change alone would 
be sufficient to provide health or disability insurance to all the uninsured.  But it might make a 
start.
59
58B. Douglas Bernheim, Lorenzo Forni, Jagadeesh Gokhale, & Laurence J. Kotlikoff, The Adequacy of Life 
Insurance: Evidence from the Health and Retirement Survey (NBER Working Paper #7372) (October 1999).  In the 
authors’ sample, almost one third of wives and more than 10 percent of husbands would have suffered living standard 
reductions of 20 percent or more had their spouses died in 1992.  The authors also found that underinsurance tends to 
be more common among low-income households, couples with asymmetric earnings, younger households, couples 
with dependent children, and non-whites. Among some groups, the frequency of underinsurance exceeds two-thirds.  
This paper can be found at http://www.nber.org/papers/w7372.
59A rough but conservative calculation would run as follows.  Of the $80 billion in tort payments made each 
year, slightly more than half, or about $40 billion, is paid for noneconomic loss.  See U.S Tort Costs, note _ supra, at 
17.   Approximately 15 percent of the population is uninsured for health care.  Therefore, about 15 percent of $40 
billion, or $6 billion, is available for recovery by first-party insurers on behalf of previously uninsured or 
underinsured individuals.  Total health insurance benefits paid each year are $846 billion.  See text at note __, supra.  
Providing corresponding benefits to the 15 percent of the population that is uninsured would cost an additional 15 
percent of this sum, or about $125 billion.  Thus, transferring full rights of tort recovery by the uninsured to first-party 
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At the same time, the effects on the market for legal services might be salutary.  At 
present, the contingent-fee system is necessary at least in part because plaintiffs have no other way 
to manage the huge payment that would otherwise be due their attorneys.  Once the purchasers of 
the services of plaintiffs’ personal injury attorneys are more often be first-party insurers, they may 
be able to take advantage of the greater clout that the reform would put in their hands.
60  A more 
competitive and perhaps very different market for the services of personal injury attorneys might 
be the result.
CONCLUSION
The world of insurance has changed enormously since the collateral source rule 
was first developed.  At that time the payment of insurance benefits to tort plaintiffs by collateral 
sources was a rarity.  Now this is routine.  Similarly, the reasons for the exemption of life 
insurance from standard subrogation rules and practices no longer apply.  But gaps in the fabric of 
first-party and social insurance protection still exist.  By looking at tort and this fabric of 
protection as one system, we can see that neither the collateral source rule as we know it nor 
legislative reversals of the rule optimize the deterrence and insurance functions of this system.  To 
achieve this goal, individuals should be given the right to transfer full subrogation rights to first-
party insurers, in return for lower premiums or expanded insurance.
insurers would pay for about 5 percent of the cost of providing health insurance to these individuals.
60For discussion of the flaws in this market, see LESTER BRICKMAN, MICHAEL J. HOROWITZ, AND JEFFREY 
O’CONNELL, RETHINKING CONTIGENCY FEES: A PROPOSAL TO ALIGN THE CONTINGENCY FEE SYSTEM WITH ITS 
POLICY ROOTS AND ETHICAL MANDATES (Manhattan Institute 1994).
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